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10
Lessons from New York
City’s Struggle Against
Amazon HQ2 in Long
Island City
Steve Lang and Filip Stabrowski

For three months between November 2018 and February
2019, the entire world, it seemed, was watching Long
Island City, Queens. On November 12, 2018, nearly two
years after Amazon CEO Jeﬀ Bezos announced that the
company would be holding a contest for its second
corporate headquarters (Amazon HQ2), New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio and New York State Governor Andrew
Cuomo jointly announced that Amazon had selected Long
Island City as one of its two HQ2 locations. The project,
outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between Amazon and New York City and State, would
provide up to $3 billion in public (state and city) subsidies
to Amazon in exchange for building 4–8 million square feet
of oﬀice space on the East River waterfront and creating
25,000 jobs averaging $150,000 per year (over ten years).

No sooner had the ink dried on the MOU, however, than
ﬁerce opposition to the plan quickly emerged. A press
conference at the proposed HQ2 site was convened the
following day, and local elected oﬀicials joined a coalition of
local labor and immigrant rights groups vowed to ﬁght the
deal. As the buzz (and controversy) concerning Amazon
HQ2 continued to grow, Governor Cuomo and Mayor de
Blasio announced the formation of a 45-member
Community Advisory Committee to “help shape” the plan
through “robust community engagement.”1 The next two
months witnessed a series of public events dedicated to the
Amazon plan—including meetings, discussions, teach-ins,
city council hearings, canvassing operations, Internet
discussion forums, and protests. Then suddenly, on
Valentine’s Day, in a tersely worded statement that cited
the “number of state and local politicians [that] have made
it clear that they oppose [Amazon’s] presence,” Amazon
announced that it was no longer planning to build its
second headquarters in Long Island City.2
The shock waves from this second surprise decision
emerged immediately and continue to reverberate today.
Amazon’s oﬀicial announcement notwithstanding, there has
been no shortage of blame (or credit) assigned for
Amazon’s sudden withdrawal from Long Island City. But
while we may never know the true reason(s) for this
decision, the struggle over the project and Amazon’s
attempt to control and manage community engagement in
the planning process are instructive in their own right.
From the arguments that emerged both for and against the
Amazon plan we can discern the contours of the emerging
struggles over urban space between big tech, the state, and
immigrant and working-class communities in global cities
such as New York City. The Amazon experience in Long

Island City also sheds light on the power of organizing
across multiple issue areas in struggles against big tech’s
designs on the contemporary city.
HQ2 IN LIC

Amazon’s announcement that it would split its second
corporate headquarters between Arlington, VA and Long
Island City, NY, was the culmination of a nearly two-yearlong “selection” process—likened to the “Hunger Games”—
involving over 200 American cities, New York included. As
part of this competition, cities pitched themselves to
Amazon by oﬀering up not just ﬁnancial incentives
(including subsidies and tax breaks) for HQ2, but also—and
perhaps more consequentially—vast amounts of city data
that Amazon would otherwise be challenged to obtain.3
New York City’s initial application included ﬁve potential
urban sites (Midtown West, Lower Manhattan, Downtown
Brooklyn, Long Island City, Governor’s Island), with Long
Island City ultimately winning out.
Signiﬁcantly, the MOU also stipulated that the project
would be designed as a General Project Plan, thereby
enabling the state to impose eminent domain and
bypassing the local, city council-mandated approval
process known as the Uniform Land Use Review Process
(ULURP). Bypassing ULURP, according to city and state
planning oﬀicials, would allow for an expedited planning
process that would better suit Amazon’s time frame. It
would also, critics emphasized, remove the opportunities
for negotiation and compromise between the developers,
the city, and local stakeholder groups aﬀorded by ULURP.
Instead, like the Atlantic Yards development project before
it, the Amazon plan would be subjected to a less onerous
approval process under the auspices of a New York State

panel known as the Public Authorities Control Board
(PACB).
THE CASE FOR HQ2

Though proponents of the Amazon plan emphasiszed the
diﬀerent aspects of the project that they felt would
ultimately beneﬁt the city and community, the core
argument for HQ2 in Long Island City centered on quality
job growth. Amazon’s spectacular growth on a global scale
promised further expansion and job creation with its
second headquarters. Addressing the New York City
Council in December 2019, James Patchett, head of New
York State Economic Development Corporation (EDC),
captured the logic behind this growth-oriented approach to
economic and urban development. The anticipated job
growth (“tens of thousands of jobs”) was expected to yield
$30 billion in tax revenue to the city and state—an
“exponential return on investment” that could be used to
deliver public beneﬁts such as improved local schools,
libraries, transit, and infrastructure. From this perspective,
the multiplier eﬀects of Amazon HQ2 represented a winwin opportunity for all New Yorkers. According to Patchett:
From a jobs perspective, the Amazon opportunity will
help real people in concrete ways. From the small
business owner who will see an increase in foot traﬀic at
her bodega, to the construction worker who will help
build the headquarters, to the CUNY computer science
student who will land a life-changing internship at the
company, it is clear this deal is about New Yorkers, front
and center.4

More importantly, the anticipated new jobs at Amazon were
not just any jobs; rather, they were “tech” jobs whose
growth would provide a kind of insurance against any
future downturn or recession that might negatively aﬀect
the ﬁnance industry—a sector whose disproportionate
power/inﬂuence in New York City has been made
abundantly clear following the downturns of the early
1990s, the early 2000s (following the terrorist attacks on
9/11), and the Great Recession of 2008. Building HQ2 in
Long Island City, Patchett claimed, would create a “reliable
ﬁnancial anchor,” thereby “cushioning the city against
slumps we know will come.”5
With Amazon HQ2 ﬁrmly ensconced in the city,
moreover, local educational institutions such as the City
University of New York (CUNY) and the State University of
New York (SUNY) would be well-positioned to create
“talent pipelines” to employers such as Amazon. Along with
the city and state, Amazon would invest into job-training
programs focusing on under-represented New Yorkers.
Students from nearby LaGuardia Community College, one
of the most diverse institutions of higher learning in the
world, and residents from the Queensbridge Houses, the
largest public housing development in North America, were
the intended targets of these new initiatives.
Patchett also lauded the Amazon HQ2 plan for the
“unprecedented infrastructure investments in Long Island
City” that would follow. In a neighborhood that had
witnessed a massive boom in residential construction over
the past decade, the Amazon plan for jobs and oﬀice space
would complement the newly built housing, while reversing
the existing commuting patterns that have characterized
Long Island City as a bedroom community for workers in
Manhattan. Far from taxing further the local infrastructure

(such as sewers and subways), the plan would actually
improve it by balancing out the live/work ratio in Long
Island City and generating tax revenue for infrastructural
investment. Amazon HQ2 was thus promoted as an example
of smart and “comprehensive” urban planning, an
innovative and forward-looking post-industrial waterfront
project in the hyper-diverse borough of Queens. Unlike
more traditional corporate oﬀice parks and technology
campuses, moreover, HQ2 would not turn its back on the
surrounding city by providing services (especially food and
drink) in-house. Instead, limited on-site oﬀerings would
encourage Amazon workers to venture out into Long Island
City and patronize its shops and restaurants.6
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—Amazon HQ2
would sit prominently, and visibly, on the East River
waterfront across from the United Nations. A stone’s throw
from the sparkling new Cornell Tech campus on Roosevelt
Island, and perched on the western end of the world’s most
diverse urban area (Queens), HQ2 would serve as a
powerful symbol of the tech industry in New York City. By
locating outside of Manhattan, moreover, the world’s most
powerful corporation would have space in which to settle
and expand, nurturing an ecosystem of start-ups and
solidifying New York City’s place as a rival to Silicon Valley
in the process.7
THE CASE AGAINST HQ2

Opposition to the Amazon HQ2 plan emerged forcefully and
immediately. In fact, the seeds of the anti-Amazon coalition
that emerged had been planted well before the company’s
announcement in November 2018. More than a year prior,
in October 2017, a coalition of grassroots community and
labor groups, including New York City Communities for

Change, Make the Road New York, the Retail, Wholesale
and Department Store Union (RWDSU), and the Alliance
for a Greater New York (ALIGN) drafted a letter to Mayor
Bill de Blasio and Governor Andrew Cuomo stating their
opposition to any state or local ﬁnancial incentives for
Amazon, including sales tax exemptions, property tax
abatements, or corporate income tax credits. The following
July, just months before the HQ2 announcement, the same
coalition of local labor and community groups organized a
protest against Amazon for reportedly selling whitesupremacist products on its website. Rallying outside an
Amazon-sponsored summit in Manhattan, one protest
organizer stated that “Amazon CEO Jeﬀ Bezos wants
taxpayer dollars and community resources to bring HQ
[headquarters] to here. But we are here to say no … .”8
It was in such a context that Amazon HQ2 in Long Island
City was announced. Critics, including city council member
Jimmy Van Bramer and state senator Michael Gianaris—
both of whom represented districts in which the proposed
HQ2 site was located—assailed the plan on several fronts.
They expressed outrage that $3 billion in public subsidies
would be going to the world’s richest man, at a time when
New York City’s own subways were falling apart and its
public housing deteriorating. More substantively, critics
pointed out that tax breaks rarely if ever make a diﬀerence
in corporate headquarter location decisions, and were thus
perfectly unnecessary.
The much-trumpeted jobs that HQ2 would create also
came under ﬁre. For low-income and working-class
residents, the $150,000 per year jobs were clearly not
intended for them. In place of job guarantees for local
residents of public housing, Amazon oﬀered job fairs and
resume-building workshops. When pushed by council

members and protesters at city council hearings, it oﬀered
just 30 customer service center jobs for Queensbridge
residents. Moreover, critics viewed the $5 million that
Amazon had pledged for tech training programs as a
pittance at best, and entirely self-serving at worst—
particularly considering how the city and state were also
expected to contribute $5 million each to these programs.
Another issue of deep concern for the opposition to HQ2
was the anticipated residential displacement eﬀects of the
project. In the midst of an aﬀordable housing crisis, with a
spate of luxury residential developments already pushing
rents steadily higher, tenant organizers in Western Queens
were highly critical of the further gentriﬁcation that HQ2
would unleash. The thousands of new high-income
individuals working for Amazon would not just be living in
the newly built housing of Long Island City, but would be
colonizing the working-class and immigrant “frontline”
communities of Astoria, Sunnyside, Woodside, Jackson
Heights, Elmhurst, and Corona as well. Local antigentriﬁcation activist groups such as the Justice For All
Coalition and Queens Neighborhoods United saw Amazon
as, in the words of one activist, a “great neutron bomb of
gentriﬁcation” in Western Queens.
For the local elected leaders who opposed Amazon HQ2,
however, perhaps the most egregious ﬂaw in the plan was
the way it sought to subvert the urban policy-making
process itself. Speciﬁcally, by bypassing ULURP in favor of
the General Project Plan, critics argued, vital public input
and consultation would be excluded from the HQ2 planning
process. This, according to Van Bramer, was nothing less
than a state-backed, corporate subversion of democracy:

Bypassing ULURP is a direct assault on community
engagement and consultation on a project that would
change the face of Queens … It’s outrageous, secretive
and the height of corporate Democrats tripping over
themselves to provide corporate welfare to the richest
man in the world without any community review or
votes.9
Reinforcing this argument was Amazon’s track record in
Seattle, Amazon’s ﬁrst and only headquarter city. In a
meeting co-organized by RWDSU and Make the Road New
York, in the time period between the two city council
hearings on Amazon, local elected oﬀicials, union members,
and community activists heard directly from a delegation
from the Seattle City Council. At the meeting, the Seattle
delegation discussed Amazon’s impact on local rents and
income inequality, as well as the methods and tactics
(including threatening to freeze all construction in the city)
it employed in battling against eﬀorts by local elected
oﬀicials to enact a worker tax on corporations to fund
aﬀordable housing and homeless services.
Thus, as the debate over HQ2 intensiﬁed in late 2018
and early 2019, the opposition mobilized around an
expanding set of concerns that moved quickly beyond the
local eﬀects of the plan, linking groups across space and
issue area in the process. For example, though the plan
itself included no warehouse worker jobs, Amazon’s track
record of poor and dangerous labor conditions and
aggressive union-busting eﬀorts in its fulﬁllment centers
across the country came under scrutiny. Organizers shared
Amazon “horror stories” at public meetings and Internet
chat groups and drew attention to existing conditions at
one of its fulﬁllment centers on Staten Island, where more

than 2,500 workers were employed. This issue emerged
most visibly in the two New York City Council hearings
devoted to Amazon HQ2 in December 2018 and January
2019. In the December hearings, as a group of Staten
Island workers announced their plans to unionize on the
steps of City Hall, inside the council chambers Amazon’s
Vice President for Public Policy was grilled by council
members about Amazon’s warehouse working conditions.
During the hearings, the executive stated that he could not
guarantee that Amazon’s Staten Island workers would not
be required to work more than eight hours per day.10 At the
follow-up hearings in January, the same Amazon executive
admitted that Amazon would not commit to remaining
neutral in any attempts by its workers to unionize. This
took several city council members aback, as it presented a
clear challenge to the image of New York City as a “union
town.” It also brought members of the RWDSU and the
Teamsters to join local activist groups on the steps of City
Hall to protest the HQ2 plan during the January hearings.11
An even more signiﬁcant issue serving to mobilize the
diverse coalition of grassroots groups in opposition to the
HQ2 plan was Amazon’s history of providing products and
services, including cloud computing and facial recognition
technology, to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agency. The issue was ﬁrst highlighted as politically
signiﬁcant at a meeting of some 150 activists, Queens
residents, local businesses, and citywide community-based
organizations, initiated by ALIGN just days after the HQ2
announcement. It emerged much more spectacularly in the
ﬁrst Amazon city council hearing (December 12), when
Amazon’s Vice President of Public Policy implicitly admitted
that Amazon had provided ICE with services and products,

by simply stating that “We believe the government should
have the best available technology.”12
The comment was immediately captured, edited, and reexported via social media by MPower Change, an online
“Muslim grassroots movement” co-founded by Linda
Sarsour, and ALIGN. In another video that had gone viral,
Mayor Bill de Blasio was asked directly on camera whether
he had known previously about Amazon’s relationship with
ICE—to which he gave an awkward non-response. In
Queens, where an estimated 1.1 million immigrants live, an
estimated 138 languages are spoken, and raids by ICE
agents have become a regularity under the current
presidential administration, these revelations were more
ammunition for the ﬁght against HQ2. Local immigrantserving groups such as Desis Rising Up and Moving
(DRUM) and Make the Road New York mobilized grassroots
opposition to HQ2 on the basis of Amazon’s relationship
with ICE, among other issues.13
NO NEGOTIATIONS

For a core group of activist organizations ﬁghting against
HQ2, Amazon’s well-established track record made any
cooperation or negotiation with the company a non-starter.
This position was expressed most clearly by the grassroots
activist group Queens Neighborhoods United in a
statement issued in December 2019. The statement
included four “Principles of Engagement”:14
1) We will not meet or communicate with Amazon or any
of its representatives.
2) We will not meet or communicate with any politicians
who have previously endorsed AmazonHQ2 or have
connections to the Real Estate Industry. This includes

every politician who signed the statement, dated
October 16, 2017, endorsing AmazonHQ2.
3) We will oppose AmazonHQ2 in its entirety—with or
without public subsidies—and reject any discussion
about concessions or negotiation.
4) We respect the diversity of tactics used in the ﬁght
against Amazon HQ2.
Facing intense political pressure (and potential primary
challengers) from the left, both Van Bramer and Gianaris
also adopted a position of no negotiation with Amazon.
Both incumbents had witnessed the shocking unseating of
long-time congressperson and Democratic Party boss
Joseph Crowley by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) just
months earlier, and were loathe to test their political
fortunes against these same groups (including members of
the Queens Democratic Socialists of America, the group
most responsible for AOC’s stunning victory) in future
electoral contests. Initially staked out just after the
announcement, their position of no negotiation with
Amazon was put to the test less than a month later, when
Governor Cuomo announced the formation of the 45member Community Advisory Committee (CAC). This group
of local and citywide “community stakeholders” was
charged with “helping ensure that community priorities
and needs are considered throughout the process.”15
Amid the discussions over the value, purpose and
legitimacy of the CAC, questions of who actually
represented the “community” and what “community
priorities and needs” really meant quickly arose. Two local
stakeholder institutions that have long represented the
poor and underserved in the area—LaGuardia Community
College and NYCHA’s Queensbridge Houses—emerged as

key players in this debate. Both institutions had
representation on the CAC. President Mellow of LaGuardia
Community College was appointed co-chair of the
Workforce Development Committee, a position she shared
with Bishop Michael Taylor, CEO and President of Urban
Upbound. April Simpson, President of the Queensbridge
Houses Tenant Association, was also a key member of the
CAC. President Mellow welcomed the CAC as a way of
building “a robust workforce development process that
creates the human infrastructure necessary to maintain a
vital and equitable workforce for our community,” while
Bishop Taylor gushed about how “the arrival of Amazon will
revitalize neighborhood businesses and jumpstart young
entrepreneurial minds in our communities.”16
As representatives of underserved and disadvantaged
members of the Long Island City “community”, Mellow,
Taylor, and Simpson constituted the organizational
infrastructure that would be required to form an eﬀective
“pipeline” connecting the minority and low-income
residents of Queens-bridge and students at LaGuardia with
local tech employers, chief among them Amazon. Under
President Mellow, LaGuardia Community College had
embraced the notion that a major function of the institution
is workforce development and that the future of
employment for ﬁrst-generation community college
students is in the tech sector. LaGuardia was also no
stranger to corporate partnerships and workforce training
initiatives. Long before Amazon, it partnered with Goldman
Sachs on a small business center, the Weill Cornell
Medicine for a program in medical billing, and Google for a
certiﬁcate program to train IT support workers. Within a
day of the surprise HQ2 announcement, the LaGuardia

home page displayed a banner welcoming Amazon to Long
Island City.
Similarly, Urban Upbound, which provides employment
services for public housing and low-income residents,
ﬁgured prominently in the public debate over whether the
Amazon plan would bring concrete beneﬁts to residents of
Queensbridge Houses. Beyond serving as co-chair of the
Workforce Development Subcommittee of the CAC, Taylor
issued press statements and organized a pro-Amazon rally
at Queensbridge Houses, where he denounced the “people
from Connecticut, from other boroughs, from other places
… knocking on doors telling people because of Amazon,
because of this, you’re going to lose your apartment.”17
The third key member of the CAC was April Simpson,
President of the Queensbridge Houses Residents
Association. She too chided the hard opposition to Amazon
HQ2, likening them to “sneaky thieves in the night”
inﬁltrating Queensbridge Houses and other NYCHA
developments in an eﬀort to spread misinformation about
the Amazon plan and the role of the CAC. Days after the
Amazon withdrawal, Simpson excoriated Van Bramer and
Gianaris, calling them “grandstanding politicians” and
holding them responsible for New York missing “a
generational opportunity to cement its place as the tech
hub of the future.”18 Several months later, she continued to
lament Amazon’s departure on the editorial pages of the
Daily News, claiming that she and other community leaders
“had a seat at the table” with Amazon and had been making
progress towards concrete beneﬁts when the company, in
the face of opposition from political opportunists, pulled
the plug on the plan.19
With such high-proﬁle leaders of community institutions
such as LaGuardia Community College, Urban Upbound,

and the Queensbridge Houses Residents Association
serving on the CAC, the refusal of Van Bramer and Gianaris
to join the committee was all the more consequential.
Facing constant pressure from grassroots organizers to
remain committed to their initial position of no
compromise, Van Bramer and Gianaris issued a joint
statement in which they described the CAC as “a thinly
veiled attempt to present the Amazon development as a fait
accompli.” Without the participation of local elected
oﬀicials at both the city and state levels, the CAC’s
community bona ﬁdes were directly called into question.
Of the two local elected oﬀicials to refuse to participate
in the CAC, it was Gianaris whose decision was most
impactful. As the deputy majority leader of the New York
State Senate representing the site of the future Amazon
HQ2, Gianaris was a logical choice to serve on the PACB,
the obscure state board whose approval was necessary for
the plan to move forward. As one of the three voting
members of the PACB, Gianaris would wield veto power
over the plan. Ultimately, however, the threat of a Gianaris
veto sinking HQ2 never materialized; on February 14,
2019, Amazon abruptly announced that it would be
canceling its plans to establish its second headquarters in
Long Island City.
AFTER AMAZON: LESSONS FROM THE STRUGGLE

With Amazon’s thinly worded withdrawal from the HQ2
plan, proponents and opponents alike were left wondering
what killed the deal. How and why did the world’s most
powerful corporation fall ﬂat in its New York City debut,
and what might this portend for corporate urban futures
more generally? While the answer to the former question
will have to await future historians, the latter question is

worth considering and there are certainly important
lessons to be learned from the Amazon HQ2 experience in
Long Island City.
First, it is clear that Amazon will seek to bend state and
municipal governments to its will. The nearly two-year-long
HQ2 “competition” enabled Amazon to play cities against
each other, reinforcing the notion that cities need the
company—and not the other way around. When Amazon did
“select” Long Island City, it did so on the condition—and
presumably under the expectation—that it would enjoy an
expedited planning and approval process that would bypass
local layers of scrutiny and negotiation. When challenged
on this (and several other points of its plan), rather than
yield to local representatives, Amazon chose instead to
replace them with an unelected “Community Advisory
Committee.”
Second, the scale and scope of Amazon’s operations—
which make it an economic behemoth the likes of which
have not been seen since the age of the great trusts—are
also, paradoxically, the source of its political vulnerability
at the local level. Having inserted itself into our daily lives
through its cloud computing, online shopping platform, vast
logistics network, and much, much more (including Whole
Foods and The Washington Post), Amazon has become the
invisible backbone to our everyday economic lives. Yet this
very ubiquity has made it an expansive target for the
opposition. The inescapability of Amazon has made it an
almost impossible-to-miss target, allowing for links to be
forged across diﬀerent groups, campaigns, and areas of
concern. In New York City, the Amazon announcement
immediately set oﬀ a chain reaction among scores of labor
and community groups, immigrant rights organizations,
and academics at the local and extra-local levels. This

concatenation of opposition forces targeted Amazon at
various sites through New York City, from its fulﬁllment
center on Staten Island, to its ﬁrst “brick-and-mortar” store
in Manhattan, to its Whole Foods stores, to the very site of
the proposed HQ2 in Long Island City. Over a three-month
period, from the announcement to the withdrawal, the
opposition to Amazon HQ2 presented itself vocally and
visibly at every turn.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in dealing with an
adversary of such size, power, and inﬂexibility as Amazon,
it is vital that the opposition contain a kernel that is
committed to no compromise and no negotiation. This is
particularly
important
given
Amazon’s
eﬀorts
to
manufacture community and consent through bodies such
as the CAC, where the price of participation is the
legitimization of the process and the acceptance of the
(likely preordained) outcome. Signiﬁcantly, however, in
order for this position to stand a chance of success, it must
be supported by a credible political threat that would bring
with it serious political consequences. In the case of New
York City, the volatile political landscape of Western Queens
and the rise of an insurgent left following the shock victory
of AOC presented just such a possibility. While we will
never know if Gianaris would have vetoed the plan or not—
and there is no guarantee that a position of no compromise
will always succeed—in the absence of such a position,
failure is a near certainty.
POSTSCRIPT

In December 2019, less than a year after its surprise
withdrawal from HQ2 in Long Island City, Amazon quietly
announced that it had signed a lease for 335,000 square
feet of oﬀice space in the new Hudson Yards development

on Manhattan’s Far Westside. While far smaller than HQ2,
the space is intended for at least 1,500 employees from its
consumer and advertising groups and represents a sizeable
increase in Amazon’s corporate presence in New York City.
It also comes with no city or state tax breaks—a point that
was lost on neither Gianaris nor AOC, both of whom were
quick to embrace the announcement as a vindication of
their staunch opposition to HQ2. Upon learning of the
lease, Gianaris stated, “Amazon is coming to New York, just
as they always planned. Fortunately, we dodged a $3 billion
bullet by not agreeing to their subsidy shakedown earlier
this year.” In a similar vein, AOC quickly took to Twitter:
“Won’t you look at that: Amazon is coming to NYC anyway
—*without* requiring the public to ﬁnance shady deals,
helipad handouts for Jeﬀ Bezos, & corporate giveaways.”20
Beyond vindication for two of HQ2’s most reviled
political critics, Amazon’s expansion into the Hudson Yards
may signal an important shift in the perceived balance of
power between cities and tech giants such as Amazon.
Whereas the Hunger Games-like competition for HQ2 and
the winner-take-all urbanism it represents posit a world in
which cities must hand over their keys to court big tech
“saviors” such as Amazon, the HQ2 experience (and its
aftermath) in New York City suggests the opposite: that it
is the big tech corporations that are dependent on cities
with their deep talent pools, world-class amenities, and
industry ecosystems. None of this is of course a foregone
conclusion; what is ultimately necessary is the political will
to call the bluﬀ of corporations such as Amazon—and their
enablers at the state and local levels.
NOTES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

Kenneth Lovett, “Cuomo, de Blasio Announce After-the-Fact Community
advisory committee for Amazon project,” Daily News, December 11, 2018,
www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/nypol-cuomo-deblasio-amazonadvisory-committee-20181211-story.html. Accessed December 1, 2019.
J. David Goodman, “Amazon Pulls Out of Planned New York City
Headquarters,”
New
York
Times,
February
14,
2019,
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/nyregion/amazon-hq2-queens.html. Accessed
December 1, 2019.
Karen Weisse, “High-Tech Degrees and the Price of an Avocado: The Data
New York Gave to Amazon,” New York Times, December 12, 2018,
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/technology/amazon-new-york-hq2-data.html.
Accessed December 1, 2019.
James Patchett, “NYCEDC President James Patchett Testimony—NYC
Council Finance Committee Hearing,” NYCEDC, January 30, 2019,
https://edc.nyc/press-release/nycedc-president-james-patchett-testimonynyc-council-ﬁnance-committee-hearing Accessed December 1, 2019.
Ibid.
J. David Goodman, “Amazon has a New Strategy to Sway Skeptics in New
York,”
New
York
Times,
January
29,
2019,
www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/nyregion/amazon-new-york-long-islandcity.html. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Josh Barro, “Here’s Why New York is Resorting to Paying Amazon $3 Billion
for what Google will do for Free,” New York Magazine, November 13, 2018,
http://n.ymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/why-new-york-is-paying-amazonusd3-billion.html. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Jimmy Tobias, “The Amazon Deal was not Brought Down by a Handful of
Politicians: It was Felled by a Robust Grassroots Coalition,” The Nation,
February 25, 2019, www.thenation.com/article/the-amazon-deal-was-notbrought-down-by-a-handful-of-politicians/ Accessed December 1, 2019.
Jimmy Van Bramer, twitter account, 2018, thttps://twitter.com/JimmyVan
Bramer/status/1061031513029050374. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Gabby Del Valle, “New York Already has Thousands of Amazon Workers—
and Some are Unionizing to Demand Better Conditions,” Vox, December 12,
2018,
www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/12/12/18138246/amazon-hq2-newyork-city-hearing. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Samantha Maldonado, “Amazon’s Anti-union Stance Exacerbates
Opposition,” Politico, January 30, 2019, www.politico.com/states/newyork/city-hall/story/2019/01/30/amazons-anti-union-stance-exacerbatesopposition-825839. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Paige Leskin, “Amazon’s Public Policy Exec Got Booed at a Meeting with
New York Council Members,” Business Insider, December 12, 2018,
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-ice-government-provides-facialrecognition-tech-2018-12. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Daniel Medina, “The Grassroots Coalition that took on Amazon … and
Won,”
The
Guardian,
March
24,
2019,

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.

19.

20.

www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/23/the-grassroots-coalitionthat-took-on-amazon-and-won. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Queens Neighborhoods United, “No AmazonHQ2 Principles and
Statement,” Queens Anti-Gentriﬁcation Project, December 12, 2018,
https://queensantigentriﬁcation.org/2018/12/24/fuck-oﬀ-amazon-noamazonhq2-principles-of-engagement-statement/. Accessed December 1,
2019.
New York State, “Governor Cuomo and Mayor De Blasio Announce
Community Advisory Committee to Guide Amazon Project,” December 11,
2018,
www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-and-mayor-de-blasioannounce-community-advisory-committee-guide-amazon.
Accessed
December 1, 2019.
Ibid.
Mark Hallum, “‘You can’t speak for us’: Astoria & Long Island City
Residents Blast Opponents of Amazon HQ Proposal,” QNS, February 19,
2019, https://qns.com/story/2019/02/11/you-cant-speak-for-us-astoria-longisland-city-residents-blast-opponents-of-amazon-hq-proposal/.
Accessed
December 1, 2019.
Bill Parry, “‘They let us down’: Queens NYCHA Reps Blast Gianaris & Van
Bramer for Amazon Deal Failure” QNS, February 15, 2019,
https://qns.com/story/2019/02/15/they-let-us-down-queens-nycha-reps-blastgianaris-van-bramer-for-amazon-deal-failure/. Accessed December 1, 2019.
April Simpson, “After Amazon Left, Silence: A Public Housing Resident Says
Politicians and Others who Claimed to Care About Jobs have Done Nothing
Since,”
New
York
Daily
News,
July
29,
2019,
www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-after-amazon-left-silence-20190729msx7fbuqrfhhrfzo6er2s4vmim-story.html. Accessed December 1, 2019.
Ed Shanahan, “Amazon Grows in New York, Reviving Debate Over
Abandoned Queens Project,” New York Times, December 9, 2019,
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/nyregion/amazon-hudson-yards.html.
Accessed December 1, 2019.

